This Medium severity Cryptographic Failure vulnerability was introduced in versions 10.1.1, 10.2.0, 10.3.0, 10.4.0, 10.5.0, 10.6.0, 10.7.1, 11.0.0, and 11.1.0 of Jira Service Management Data Center.

This Cryptographic Failure vulnerability, with a CVSS Score of 8.2 and a CVSS Vector of CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber allows an unauthenticated attacker to expose assets in your environment susceptible to exploitation, which has high impact to confidentiality, no impact to integrity, no impact to availability, and requires no user interaction.

Atlassian recommends that Jira Service Management Data Center customers upgrade to latest version, if you are unable to do so, upgrade your instance to one of the specified supported fixed versions:

• Jira Service Management Data Center 11.1: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 11.1.1
• Jira Service Management Data Center 10.3: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 10.3.13

See the release notes
(https://confluence.atlassian.com/servicemanagement/jira-service-management-release-notes-780083086.html). You can
download the latest version of Jira Service Management Data Center from the download center
(https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira/service-management/download-archives).

The National Vulnerability Database provides the following description for this vulnerability:

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, NTRU reduced secret values with the % operator in three helpers whose reference implementations are deliberately division-free, so each reduction was carried out by an integer division whose latency depends on the secret operand. Polynomial.modQ divided by a variable divisor, which a compiler cannot strength-reduce to a multiply the way it can a constant one, so it emitted a division on every call including on the decapsulation path where the dividend derives from the private key; Polynomial.mod3 and NTRUSampling.mod3 divided the secret key polynomials f and g during key generation, the message polynomials r and m during encapsulation, and coefficients recovered during decapsulation. An attacker able to measure that timing can recover information about the NTRU private key. modQ now masks, which is exact because q is always a power of two, and mod3 uses the reference implementation's division-free fold and select; the results are unchanged.