This High severity DoS (Denial of Service) vulnerability was introduced in version 7.2.0 of Crowd Data Center.

This DoS (Denial of Service) vulnerability, with a CVSS Score of 7.5 and a CVSS Vector of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H allows an unauthenticated attacker to expose assets in your environment susceptible to exploitation, which has no impact to confidentiality, no impact to integrity, high impact to availability, and requires no user interaction.

Atlassian recommends that Crowd Data Center customers upgrade to latest version, if you are unable to do so, upgrade your instance to one of the specified supported fixed versions:

• Crowd Data Center 7.2: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 7.2.4

See the release notes (https://confluence.atlassian.com/crowd/crowd-release-notes-199094.html). You can download the
latest version of Crowd Data Center from the download center
(https://www.atlassian.com/software/crowd/download-archive).

The National Vulnerability Database provides the following description for this vulnerability:

StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength (default 50,000 characters) is intended to bound how much memory a single JSON Object property name can consume while being parsed, independently of the much larger maxStringLength (default 100,000,000 characters) that bounds ordinary string values. For parsers built over character input — Reader, String or char[] sources, all served by ReaderBasedJsonParser — that bound is not applied while the name is being accumulated. The code path instead re-uses the string-value length check, which is roughly 2000x larger by default.

In the character-input slow path, ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2() accumulates the name into the TextBuffer and, when a segment fills, calls TextBuffer.finishCurrentSegment(), which validates only maxStringLength. The correct check, StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength(int), is reached afterwards in CharsToNameCanonicalizer.findSymbol(), once the entire name has been scanned to its closing quote. By that point the full name — up to maxStringLength characters — has already been buffered in memory.

A remote attacker who can have a single sufficiently long JSON Object property name parsed through this path can force allocation on the order of 100,000,000 characters (approximately 200 MB, with segment bookkeeping pushing real peak usage higher) before any StreamConstraintsException is thrown, instead of the approximately 50,000-character (about 100 KB) bound the API promises. Repeating this across concurrent requests can exhaust the heap and crash the process. No authentication or user interaction is required. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is disabled by default (-1), nothing else bounds the token first, so the issue is exploitable under default configuration.

Byte-input parsers are not affected: UTF8StreamJsonParser, UTF8DataInputJsonParser and the non-blocking (async) parsers re-validate maxNameLength on every growth of the name-decode buffer via ParserBase._growNameDecodeBuffer(), rejecting an oversized name after allocating only tens of kilobytes. Applications are exposed when untrusted JSON is parsed from a String, Reader or char[] — for example an HTTP request body already read into a String — rather than from raw UTF-8 bytes.

This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from 2.16.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.16.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength was first introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0.