This High severity Cryptographic Failure vulnerability was introduced in versions 10.2.22 and 12.1.10 of Bamboo Data Center.

This Cryptographic Failure vulnerability, with a CVSS Score of 7.1 and a CVSS Vector of CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber allows an unauthenticated attacker to expose assets in your environment susceptible to exploitation, which has no impact to confidentiality, high impact to integrity, no impact to availability, and requires user interaction.

Atlassian recommends that Bamboo Data Center customers upgrade to latest version, if you are unable to do so, upgrade your instance to one of the specified supported fixed versions:

• Bamboo Data Center 12.1: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 12.1.12
• Bamboo Data Center 10.2: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 10.2.24

See the release notes (https://confluence.atlassian.com/bambooreleases/bamboo-release-notes-1189793869.html). You can
download the latest version of Bamboo Data Center from the download center
(https://www.atlassian.com/software/bamboo/download-archives).

The National Vulnerability Database provides the following description for this vulnerability:

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, BLS12_381BasicScheme.keyValidate, and so BLSPublicKeyParameters and every BasicScheme, MessageAugmentation and ProofOfPossession verify and aggregateVerify that gate on it, accepted a public key built on a foreign ECCurve that merely shares BLS12-381's field characteristic. The prime-order subgroup check trusts a point's own curve to name its cofactor, since ECPoint.satisfiesOrder returns true outright when the curve's cofactor is one, so a point on a curve with a different equation and a cofactor forged to one passed keyValidate despite not being a G1 point at all. In BC's pairing implementation such a point contributes the identity in the target group, so an aggregate signature verified against a set of public keys including it is accepted even though it contains no signature for that key and message pair, admitting a phantom signer. keyValidate now first confirms that the point's curve carries exactly the canonical G1 field, equation, order and cofactor before any subgroup check. The issue is reachable only where an application constructs an ECPoint on an explicit, non-canonical curve and accepts it as an authority-bearing key; the standard 48-byte compressed-point decoder always supplies the canonical curve and was never affected.